article[s] found via yahoo.com”s news search
China’s military says its naval exercises near Japan’s island of Okinawa are routine and not a threat after Tokyo complained of a close encounter.
By ph.news.yahoo.com

article[s] found via yahoo.com”s news search
TOKYO | Two Chinese submarines and several warships were spotted in international waters off Japan’s southern island of Okinawa at the weekend, and Tokyo is investigating what the military vessels were doing there, the defense minister said Tuesday. Encounters between China’s growing military and the Japanese navy have increased in the waters between the two countries in recent years. Both …
By washingtontimes.com

article[s] found via yahoo.com”s news search
TOKYO – Two Chinese submarines and several warships were spotted in international waters off Japan’s southern island of Okinawa at the weekend, and Tokyo is investigating what the military vessels were doing there, the defence minister said Tuesday.
By ca.news.yahoo.com

Click here for original article
China has good reason to refuse a proposed visit to Hong Kong of three Japanese warships, Chinese media and experts are saying.

They said the ships should not be made welcome following recent decisions in Tokyo to host Xinjiang separatist Rebiya Kadeer and allow planned visits from former Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui and the Dalai Lama.

The website of Japan’s Asahi Shinbun newspaper reported Sunday that the three Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels, with more than 700 naval officers and crew on board, set off from Tokyo in April. The ships called in at 13 countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe and are due back home in early September.

Though the mini fleet had no plans initially to visit Hong Kong, Japan has since raised the idea of a stopover sometime late this month or in early September in an attempt to improve exchanges with the Chinese navy, said the website.

According to the report, the Chinese government told the Japanese embassy in Beijing that “it is a sensitive issue, so far there is no atmosphere for approving Japanese warships’ stopover in Hong Kong”.

The report quoted Japanese analysts as saying that China was expressing its discontent following Japan’s reception of Kadeer, Lee Teng-hui and the Dalai Lama.

Kadeer is head of the World Uighur Congress, which is suspected of having instigated the July riots in Xinjiang that claimed at least 197 lives.

Lee and the Dalai Lama are scheduled to visit Japan and make speeches there in September and November.

A diplomat with the Japanese embassy, who declined to be named, told China Daily yesterday that Japan was still negotiating with China about the suggested visit.

An official with the Foreign Ministry’s spokesman’s office said the ministry was studying the case, while the Ministry of National Defense made no comment yesterday.

Hong Kong-based Shing Pao Daily News said in an editorial yesterday that “Beijing is assured and bold with justice” in declining the visit.

“The request for JMSDF ships to visit Hong Kong would ordinarily be normal practice among military exchanges with China but what the Japanese government did recently contradicts with the principal of friendly cooperation and made the atmosphere unsuitable,” it said.

Su Hao, director of China Foreign Affairs University’s Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, said the request from the Japanese warships to visit Hong Kong was significant because it was unprecedented, even though there is an agreement between Beijing and Washington to allow US warships to stop in Hong Kong for supplies.

The first Japanese warship to visit China after World War moored at a naval base in Zhanjiang, Guangdong province, last summer, drawing national attention because of Japan’s past invasion of China.

“It’s understandable for the government to decline such a request at a time when many sensitive issues have emerged in bilateral relations,” Su said.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/18/content_8580389.htm

By polaris

China Brief – The Jamestown Foundation

via Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Balance in the East China Sea.

On October 19, Legislator and Chairman of Congressional Caucus for the opposition party DPP (Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party) Chai Trong-rong publicly accused the Ma Ying-jeou administration of providing China with sensitive undersea survey data around Taiwan. Legislator Chai maintained that the information, which he alleged the Ma administration supplied, was germane to China’s May 11 submission of the preliminary survey findings on the outer limits of its continental shelf to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLNS) on the East China Sea. The government denied the allegation (Taipei Times, October 20). Such charges highlight the deep-seated suspicion held by the opposition party toward the Kuomintang (KMT)-led government. Yet whether Chai’s accusation proves to be true or false, the Ma administration has indeed taken a very different approach than the previous administration toward China and Japan in maritime issues related to the East China Sea and Taiwanese-claimed territorial waters.

For instance, the Taiwanese-media recently disclosed that the Ma administration is no longer claiming the territorial waters around Kinmen and Matsu, two small islands that have long been part of its frontline defense against China (Liberty Times, November 23). These two major cases constitute a growing body of evidence signaling that a major shift is underway in Taiwan’s strategic orientation, particularly in its maritime domain. Taiwan, an island strategically located at the crossroad of the western Pacific Ocean and Continental Asia, pivots on the sea-lane of communications (SLOCs) between Northeast and Southeast Asia. Taiwan’s strategic orientation, whether it folds in line with continental Asia or maritime Asia, has the potential to fundamentally alter the strategic landscape in the western Pacific.

China Becomes Taiwan’s Partner in the East China Sea

Mending relations with China has been the cornerstone of President Ma’s foreign policy. Throughout his political career, Ma has consistently advocated that “cross-Strait relation outweighs all other Taiwan’s external relations” (Liberty Times, June 10, 2008). Indeed, since his electoral victory in the March 2008 presidential election, cross-Strait relations have thawed considerably. This may be attributable to President Ma’s acceptance of the so-called “92 consensus” as the basis on which to resume official dialogue with the PRC. In his inauguration speech as KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) chairman on October 18, President Ma stated that the “92 consensus” means that both sides accept the “one China principle,” (Economic Times, October 19), yet both sides are free to interpret what “China” means [Republic of China or People's Republic of China] (Hong Kong Central News Agency, October 18).

In addition to increasing official-contacts between Taipei and Beijing, cross-Strait cooperation has also expanded into strategic areas. One of these strategic areas involves cooperation in the East China Sea. Chinese National Petroleum (CNP), a Taiwanese state-owned oil company, has intensified its joint oil-exploration cooperation efforts in the South China and East China Sea with China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a PRC government-owned oil company. In a 2002 research study conducted by a KMT-affiliated think tank, National Policy Foundation, the author called for closer cooperation with China in the areas of oil exploration in the midline of the Taiwan Strait. Three days after his inauguration, President Ma reportedly ordered an interagency study on the possibility of Taiwan-China Petroleum cooperation. According to the National Security Council’s (NSC) original planning, future focus will be on cross-Strait cooperation for oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and other offshore resources through setting up a cross-Strait joint venture (China Times, October 26, 2008). Yin Chi-min, then the Taiwanese Minister of Economy, stressed that one of the aims for accelerating cross-Strait petroleum cooperation is to enhance Taiwanese energy security (TTV.com.tw, March 16).

According to a senior Taiwanese official in the NSC, one purpose for Taiwan-China petroleum cooperation is to balance against Japan and Vietnam oil and gas exploration activities in the East and South China Sea, respectively (China Times, October 26). Indeed, cross-Strait cooperation in these areas could ameliorate the general atmosphere across the Taiwan Strait and improve political confidence on both sides as well. Implicit in this cooperation, however, is that China—Taiwan’s primary strategic adversary—is being framed by the current Taiwanese government as a strategic partner for its energy security against Vietnam and Japan, countries that Taiwan has previously had friendly relations with under the previous administration.

Taiwan-Japan Tension Increased After Ma Took Office

Taiwan-Japan relations represent another example of significant change in Taiwan foreign relations, one which is altering the regional dynamics. Despite President Ma’s claim that 2009 marks the year of “Special Partnership of Taiwan and Japan,” (Central News Agency, January 20) less than a month after taking office, a Taiwanese fishing boat entered disputed waters near Senkaku Island /Diaoyutai and the event quickly escalated into an all-out diplomatic fistfight between Taipei and Tokyo (China Post, September 1). Then Premier Liu Chao-hsuan publicly threatened to use military force if necessary to uphold Taiwan’s sovereignty claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai area (Taiwan News, June 16). Taiwan’s chief representative to Japan was recalled to protest against Japan. On June 16, Taipei also dispatched coast guard ships to guard a civilian fishing boat that entered the disputed area to proclaim sovereignty (Central News Agency, June 17). At the same time, Jian Yu, the spokesperson for China’s ministry of foreign affairs, restated the Chinese position that Diaoyutai/Senkaku is part of Chinese territory and expressed deep concern and anger toward Japan about sinking the Taiwanese ship. He also demanded that Japan stop its “illegal activity around this area” (Wenwei Pao, June 18).

As Taiwan-Japan relations continued to deteriorate into a state of diplomatic cold war after the fishing vessel incident, the Japanese Defense Ministry confirmed a Tokyo Shinbum report that it was studying plans to deploy self-defense forces on Yonagoni-Jima, which lies 67 miles (108 kilometers) from the east coast of Taiwan (Taiwan News Online, July 4). In response to this report, the Ma administration asked Tokyo to exercise self-restraint. The proposal to base military units at a time when cross-Strait tension was at an all-time low sparked a lot of speculation. Some analysts pointed out that such a move by Japanese Self Defense Forces indicates that Tokyo’s views toward Taiwan are changing, and that the island may now become a target that Japan may need to defend “against,” rather than to defend “with” (FTV English News, July 3; Taipei Times, July 6). According to the Japanese Defense Ministry spokesperson, “the [Japanese] government is currently studying this military deployment and that it will be added to the nation’s basic self-defense plans scheduled to be revised at the end of this year” (United Daily News [Taiwan], July 3).

The Collateral Damage of Ma’s Sino-centric Foreign Policy

The opposite directions in which Taiwan-China and Taiwan-Japan relations appear to be moving raises questions about the Ma administration’s capability to wage its “comprehensive diplomacy.”

Proponents of Ma’s strategy explain that this hurdle in bilateral relations is a normal development for every incoming administration; especially since the ruling-party has been in opposition for the previous eight years. This worsening development between Taiwan and Japan can be attributed to the inexperience of the incoming new government, the lack of “Japan hands” within the administration, and the deep-seated “anti-Ma” complex among some Japanese political elites. According to this school of thought, the tension will eventually go away as the administration gradually gets familiar with all the nuts and bolts of Japan affairs. It can also be argued that lowering tension across the Taiwan Strait fits Japan’s national interest as well, thus there should be no reason for Japan to oppose Ma’s foreign policy since Japan’s basic national interest is fundamentally met due to Ma’s action.

Yet, critics of Ma’s strategy believe this development is the direct result of Ma Ying-Jeou’s own “great Chinese nationalism complex,” which sees Japan through the eyes of China, rather than viewing it from the angle of Taiwanese national interest (Liberty Times, June 22, 2008). In terms of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute, Ma’s actions reneged from the tacit understanding between Taipei and Tokyo established during the previous Lee and Chen administrations. This understanding is based on a set of unstated protocols that in the event of a conflict Taipei will not send its governmental ship into the troubled area; that Taiwan will adhere to the principle of non-violence; and that this issue will remain a strictly bilateral matter between Taiwan and Japan. At the height of the Lien-Ho fishing boat tension in June 2008, between then-Premier Liu’s war talk, Ma’s pending decision to send Taiwanese naval vessels to escort civilian fishing boats entering the disputed water (Taipei Times, June 17), and a KMT legislator’s suggestion to “unite with China against Japan” (lianzhong zhiri), the Ma government broke all of the cardinal precedents of managing Taiwan-Japan relations over the East China Sea issue. Taiwan-Japan relations have not been the same since.

From the Taiwan Strait to the East China Sea: Changing Strategic Balance

The first 18 months of Ma’s administration have altered the long-standing strategic balance in the East China Sea. In spite of the territorial dispute between Taiwan and Japan, Tokyo could always count on Taipei to be a cooperative partner. Under the previous two administrations, at the very least, Taipei would not take Beijing’s side when Japan-China disputes flared up. Now that the Taiwanese government appears to be changing its position by taking a pro-China stance, Japan will face opposition not only from its Western front, but also from its Southern front if the East China Sea dispute flares up again.

This development could also pose a strategic challenge to the U.S.-Japan alliance. If Taiwan is no longer willing to play a silent but supportive role in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, it may have to prepare for the possibility that Taipei will forge a common position with China in some cases; for instance, in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku island dispute and cross-Strait oil/gas joint exploration in the East China Sea. Thus, the alliance’s capability and freedom of action will be complicated by the uncertainty in Taipei’s actions. Yet, an all-out “Chiawan” (China-Taiwan) cooperation seems unlikely in the near future, but the fundamentals of the East China Sea strategic equation are undergoing long-term changes. It seems clear from President Ma’s policy announcements, which prioritize cross-Strait relations above all other external relations, that as long as Ma remains in office, lowering tensions across the Taiwan Strait will be followed by increasing strategic uncertainty in the East China Sea.

Notes

1. Guo Boyao, “Studying the Development of Taiwan’s Oil Industry from Cross-Strait Oil Exploration,” National Policy Foundation Research Report, May 29, 2002.
2. This is based on author’s personal experience dealing with the Taiwan-Japan issue working at Taiwan’s representative office in Japan 2000-2003.

NASA chief ready to work with China on space exploration: “Tokyo (AFP) Nov 17, 2009 – NASA is ready to cooperate with China in space exploration, the head of the US agency said Tuesday, as Beijing aims to send a manned mission to the moon by around 2020.”

Military Space News, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense

via Japan, China agree to improve military, political exchanges.

Tokyo (AFP) Nov 20, 2009 – The foreign ministers of Japan and China agreed Thursday to advance political and military exchanges in a bid to foster mutual trust, a Japanese diplomat said.

China’s role on world stage is no cause for alarm, says Obama: “

Barack Obama introduced himself as America’s ‘first Pacific president’ as he launched his four-nation tour of the region, vowing to deepen ties with Asia and arguing that China’s rise should be welcomed rather than feared.

Kicking off his visit in Tokyo, he also sought to thaw the chill in relations with his hosts, America’s closest allies in the region. The new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, has vowed to make Japan less dependent on the US, but the two men agreed to put off the issue of resolving the future of US forces in Japan.

However, police in China are reported to have detained dozens of dissidents in a crackdown ahead of Obama’s arrival there today. Human rights campaigners said that at least 30 activists who were expected to apply for the right to hold protests directed at the Chinese government during the US president’s visit were arrested.

Reformers worry that Obama will play down China’s poor human rights record in order to maintain good relations on issues such as the economy. ‘We get the impression Obama doesn’t want to talk about human rights on this trip, but it is precisely because of his visit here that these people are being rounded up and detained right now,’ Ai Weiwei, a Beijing-based artist and social commentator, told the Financial Times.

Speaking yesterday during the first stop on his nine-day Asian tour, Obama told an audience of 1,500 in the Japanese capital: ‘I want every American to know that we have a stake in the future of this region, because what happens here has a direct effect on our lives at home.’

American officials have portrayed the trip as an opportunity to develop relationships and make progress on non-proliferation, climate change and the economy, and are playing down expectations of any agreements.

As in his previous foreign affairs speeches, Obama emphasised his personal ties in the region – referring to his birth in Hawaii, time in Indonesia and boyhood travels in Asia – and the administration’s break with unilateralism.

‘We welcome China’s efforts to play a greater role on the world stage – a role in which their growing economy is joined by growing responsibility,’ he said. ‘Power does not need to be a zero-sum game and nations need not fear the success of another.’

He held out a hand to North Korea again, calling for it to denuclearise; and to Burma, if it undertakes democratic reform and frees political prisoners, including opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Burma’s prime minister will be present at the president’s meeting with Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) leaders in Singapore.

Obama also announced that the US will sign up to a trans-Pacific free trade agreement. That may help to deflect accusations of protectionism, which are likely to be aired throughout his tour. He stressed the need for ‘balanced’ growth and said Asian countries should not be dependent on exports to the US.

The economic crisis has underlined the interdependence of ‘Chimerica’ in particular and the trade imbalance that has left China with vast US dollar holdings. Washington wants the Chinese currency, the yuan, to appreciate further; Beijing will repeat its concerns that US debt could endanger its dollar holdings.

But Obama’s Chinese visit is about more than money. The world’s two largest carbon emitters are meeting just weeks away from the Copenhagen climate-change conference.

China’s influence on North Korea and Iran are central to Obama’s non-proliferation agenda. Its handling of Afghanistan and Pakistan will also be high up in discussions.

Obama’s China policy is essentially his predecessor’s; the relationship is increasingly amicable. But some fear attempts to broaden it could mean less meaningful engagement.

‘Bush’s approach was: you are rising in the international system and need to take on more responsibility,’ said Victor Cha, director of Asian affairs in the National Security Council under George Bush and now at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. ‘Obama is heaping on all these very, very high expectations – on issues like climate change and currency – and I think they are expectations that China cannot possibly meet.’

China sees itself as a vulnerable developing country as well as a rising power. And shared anxieties – such as those over proliferation – do not equal identical interests. “China’s own interests in those hot spots [North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan] make it deeply conflicted about playing a larger role on the world stage,” said Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt of the International Crisis Group. “While the United States frames China in terms of its growing responsibilities as a major power, China continues to think primarily in terms of its own interests.”

To some observers, the administration is also too keen to please Beijing, wasting leverage rather than smoothing the path to greater gains.

Obama’s decision not to meet the Dalai Lama last month – aides say he will do so in future – ‘doesn’t send a signal that the US wants to work with China; it sends a signal they have basically got us,’ said Cha.

Japan Chair Platform: China: Japan’s Rising Power Conundrum: ”

China’s reemergence as the preeminent power in East Asia poses a seminal challenge to Japan. In navigating this challenge, Tokyo has pursued two complementary strategies: binding—enmeshing Beijing in international institutions—and hedging—consolidating alliance ties with the United States and developing new indigenous military capabilities.

read more

“