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BEIJING, July 9 (Xinhua) — The Chinese defense ministry refuted Japanese media reports on its military expenditure on Friday, saying the reports were “groundless.”

“China’s military budget and spending is strictly monitored. There is no hidden expenditure,” a press officer with the defense ministry said.

The comments came in response to a question concerning some recent Japanese media reports which said China’s military spending would total 788 billion yuan this year, about 1.5 times higher than the budget unveiled earlier this year.

J-15, a carrier-based heavy fighter which is being developed by China

“As for China’ s military budget in 2010, it was officially released by China’s parliament spokesman Li Zhaoxing in March,” the officer said, adding there was no hidden spending by the country’s military.

“The Japanese media reports have no grounds,” the officer added.

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By admin

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Beijing, July 10 : China has rejected Japanese media reports on its military spending being 1.5 times higher than the country’s 2010 defense budget cited in March.
By newkerala.com

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The Ministry of National Defense on Friday refuted Japanese media reports that China’s actual military spending is 1.5 times higher than the country’s 2010 defense budget cited in March.
By en.ce.cn

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The Chinese defense ministry refuted Japanese media reports on its military expenditure on Friday, saying the reports were “groundless.” “China’s military budget and spending is strictly monitored. There is no hidden expenditure,” a press officer with the defense ministry said.
By english.peopledaily.com.cn

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China’s military spending will total 788.0 billion yuan, or 10.2 trillion yen, in 2010, about 1.5 times higher than the country’s 2010 defense budget unveiled
By japantoday.com

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LONDON — After nearly two decades of double-digit increases in its military budget, China announced a mere 7.5 percent jump in its defense budget this year. It was the first time since the 1980s that China’s defense spending had increased by a single-digit percentage. The Chinese government maintained that while this increase will be used to enhance China’s ability to meet various threats, the …
By us.rd.yahoo.com

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Mar.11 (China Military News cited from Time.com and written by Austin Ramzy) — For the past two decades, China’s rapid economic growth has been twinned with an even more rapid increase in military spending. While GDP has expanded by an annual average of 9.6% over the past 10 years, the reported budget for the People’s Liberation Army has grown by an average of 16%. So it was an unexpected surprise when Li Zhaoxing, a former foreign minister who is now spokesman for the National People’s Congress, announced on March 4 that China’s defense budget would increase by 7.5% for 2010, just over half of last year’s 14.9% rise.

The slowdown was partly attributed the difficult economic climate. While China was able to grow at 8.7% last year, that healthy rate came at the expense of $586 billion in stimulus spending. Last week Premier Wen Jiabao said that government spending would grow more slowly this year as Beijing seeks to control inflation while maintaining stable growth.

Amid those economic demands, another double-digit increase in military spending might be seen as excessive. But perhaps the most compelling reason for the slowdown in spending is that Chinese officials have become more cautious of the way the development of the People’s Liberation Army is perceived abroad. Last year China marked the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic with an Oct. 1 military parade in front of Tiananmen Square. While generally a cause for celebration in China, the parade of soldiers, tanks and missile carriers was seen as intimidating by many foreign observers.

Chinese military analysts have explained the rapid spending increase as normal for a large nation climbing out of decades of poverty. “Although China now has a growing military demand, it has always upheld the principle of peaceful development. The double-digit increases in the past should be interpreted as compensational growth,” says Zhao Zongjiu, deputy secretary-in-general at Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies, a government-backed think tank. “I predict that, given the current policy environment, the growth rate of military expenses will remain roughly on the same level as China’s GDP growth in the next few years.”

China’s 2010 military budget, which is awaiting legislative approval, will be $78 billion. That would make it second only to the United States, which for 2010 has a total budget of $663.8 billion. U.S. spending is equivalent to 4.7% of the nation’s GDP, while China’s defense outlay equals about 1.5% of its estimated 2010 GDP.

But military observers have long cautioned that China’s official defense budget figures shouldn’t be taken at face value, and that actual spending could be two or three times higher than what is reported. China is engaged in a significant number of expensive military equipment development programs, including likely efforts to develop its first aircraft carrier. Those all make it difficult to curtail spending, says Andrei Chang, Hong Kong-based editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly. “There are very ambitious military plans for the Chinese,” he says. “This is the reason it’s impossible to have an increase of 7.5%.”

Improving ties with Taiwan have also lessened some of the military tension along China’s periphery. Beijing considers the self-ruled island a breakaway province that should ultimately be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary. A more China-friendly leadership in Taipei has helped eased some of the fear of armed conflict. But the region still has the potential to be a flash point. Taiwan says China has some 1,500 missiles stationed along the Taiwan Strait. And a decision by U.S. President Obama in January to approve the sale of more than $6 billion in military equipment to Taiwan has angered the Chinese government, which has postponed some military exchanges with the U.S. in protest.

Chang also notes that China is just two years away from an expected reconfiguration of its leadership. President Hu Jintao is expected to step down, and will want to secure high positions for his political allies. Drastically curtailing defense spending could alienate the military, whose support he needs to ensure top spots for his proteges. “The new round of political power struggle is continuing,” Chang says. “You have to give souvenirs to the armed forces.”

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By admin

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Beijing – China announced a 7.5-per-cent hike in its annual military budget on Thursday, following international concern over larger increases in recent years. The draft defence budget for 2010 was set at 532.115 billion yuan (77.9 billion dollars), …
By us.rd.yahoo.com

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Feb.03 (China Military News cited from Reuters and written by Adrian Croft) – China and India sharply raised defence spending in 2009 despite the economic crisis but most European NATO members face a squeeze on defence budgets as they rein in gaping deficits, a report said on Wednesday.

The impact of the global financial crisis on defence and security spending varied across regions and countries, the International Institute for Strategic Studies thinktank said in its annual report “The Military Balance”.

PLA Navy Warwhip’s Main Gun and HHQ-9 air Defense Missile

U.S. defence spending almost doubled under former President George W. Bush but President Barack Obama had signalled that the need to tackle a big budget deficit would require “a dramatic reprioritisation within defence spending”, it said.

Obama asked Congress this week to approve a record $708 billion in defense spending for fiscal 2011 — including a 3.4 percent increase in the Pentagon’s base budget — but said he would continue his drive to eliminate wasteful programmes.

A sharp recession had led the Russian government effectively to abandon a comprehensive military re-equipment plan due to run from 2007-15 and to replace it with a new 10-year plan starting in 2011, the report said.

“In contrast to developments in advanced economies, both India and China have maintained their recent trend of double-digit increases in defence spending,” it said.

PLA Army Type 59 Main Battle Tank 

India boosted defence spending by 21 percent in 2009 after the 2008 Mumbai attacks killed 166 people, it said.

China’s official 2009 budget included a 15 percent rise in defence spending to 480 billion yuan, equal to $70.3 billion at market exchange rates, the report said.

However, it said the official Chinese defence budget did not reflect the true level of resources devoted to the People’s Liberation Army. It was widely believed that the official budget took no account of weapons bought overseas or research and development funding, it said.
EUROPEAN DEFENCE LIKELY TO SUFFER

Other Asian countries, such as Australia, Indonesia and Singapore, had also posted increases in defence spending, it said.

PLA Air Force J-11B Fighter

In Europe, though, many countries had seen their budget deficits rise sharply as they pumped money into the economy to try to end the recession.

“When the time comes to redress these fiscal imbalances, discretionary spending will come under considerable pressure and defence is likely to suffer, particularly in those countries facing a looming demographic shift requiring greater expenditure on pensions and healthcare,” the editor of the Military Balance, James Hackett, wrote in the report.

Britain faced a challenge in reconciling its budget deficit with its large and growing future equipment plan, it said.

Among European members of NATO, only Norway and Denmark were likely to increase their defence budgets in 2010, and over the medium term most other countries would do well to increase defence spending in line with inflation or match existing budget levels, it said.

This would lead to pressure to step up pooling and multinational management of defence assets, to countries specialising in niche capabilities and to the collective procurement of critical defence equipment, it said.

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By admin

The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Defense Cooperation: “

For 30 years now, ever since the United States severed formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the U.S. has continued defense cooperation with Taiwan to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Despite continuing pressure from Beijing and volatility in the U.S.-PRC relationship, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and a sense of America’s moral obligation to the people of Taiwan have worked to ensure U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation and the continued sale of U.S. defense articles and services to the island. Every U.S. presidential administration, from Ronald Reagan’s onward, has understood—albeit tacitly—that the use of military force by the PRC against Taiwan would necessitate a reciprocal U.S. response; and the U.S. Pacific Command has maintained its contingency plans for the defense of Taiwan.

Nevertheless, Taiwan’s military capabilities have failed to keep pace with China’s aggressive military modernization and expansion over the past decade—the direct result of policy decisions in both Washington and Taipei. The annual U.S. Department of Defense 2009 China Military Power Report states that, “Since 2000, there have been two peaceful political transitions on Taiwan and a gradual and steady maturation of Taiwan democracy. While Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan appears to have shifted from seeking an early resolution of the Taiwan issue to one of preventing Taiwan’s de jure independence, by force if necessary, Beijing’s objective of unifying Taiwan with the Mainland has not changed. Since 2000, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift in Beijing’s favor, marked by the sustained deployment of advanced military equipment to the Military Regions opposite Taiwan” [1].

Improvements in Taiwan-China relations since Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist) President Ma Ying-jeou took office and growing U.S.-China economic interdependence, however, also have altered the status quo. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Nationalist may be on a path toward the peaceful resolution of the differences that have been the source of tension across the Taiwan Strait for over 60 years. Thus, in spite of the fact that China’s military buildup in the Taiwan Strait continues, President Barack Obama may now see a Taiwan-China détente as a rationale for dramatically reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the irritation they have consistently been to U.S.-China relations for the past 30 years.

To better understand how U.S.-Taiwan defense interaction may change in the future, however, it is first necessary to consider how it has already changed. In 2000, the March election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bien in Taiwan and the November election of George W. Bush in the United States had major impacts on the dynamics of U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. Chen’s election unseated the KMT, which had controlled Taiwan since 1949, and completed the peaceful transformation of Taiwan from a dictatorship to a democracy. In April 2001, President George W. Bush, recognizing that the relative military balance in the Taiwan Strait was changing rapidly in China’s favor, approved in principle approximately $35 billion in major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. He also altered the structure of the high-level U.S.-Taiwan defense dialogue [2]. Senior Bush administration policy makers sought to place the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship on a more balanced footing. The collision of a U.S. Navy E-P3 aircraft with a Chinese F-8 fighter over the South China Sea on April 1, 2001, and China’s detention of the U.S. crew after it made an emergency landing in China, no doubt factored into that decision [3].

Chen, however, focused more on his domestic policy agenda and Taiwan’s status in the international community than on Taiwan’s defense needs and U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation. At the same time, KMT members of the Legislative Yuan (LY)—Taiwan’s parliament—thwarted Taiwan Ministry of National Defense efforts to fund many of the programs President George W. Bush had approved to undermine Chen’s popularity and credibility (Taipei Times, April 16, 2006). Moreover, President Chen’s pursuit of policies intended to move Taiwan toward de jure independence angered senior Bush administration officials because it complicated their attempts to pursue better U.S.-China relations as Washington became more dependent on China internationally and economically. Washington needed Beijing’s assistance in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea and sought its vote in the United Nations to put pressure on Iran. China’s rapid economic growth and U.S. borrowing to finance deficit spending made China and the United States more economically interdependent.

By Bush’s second term, U.S.-China relations were again improving and serious strains in U.S.-Taiwan relations were apparent. Major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan slowed dramatically. Toward the end of the Bush administration, they came to a halt. When Taiwan failed to adequately fund U.S. programs, Washington became increasingly less willing to take the heat from China for U.S. arms sales it might approve but Taiwan might not follow through on. Therefore, Washington forced Taiwan to withdraw its request for 66 new F-16C/D aircraft in an attempt to use it as leverage to influence Chen’s policies and behavior. In October 2008, after a long delay, the Bush administration, following the 2008 U.S. presidential election and just prior to leaving office, notified Congress of only half of the $12 billion in sales pending at the State Department [4]. As of this writing, no arms sales to Taiwan have been notified since President Obama took office in January 2009.

By 2008, when President Ma Ying-jeou was elected in Taiwan and President Barack Obama was elected in the United States, both U.S.-Taiwan defense interaction and the international and cross-strait environments in which they took place were much different than during the 20 years after 1979. Democracy in Taiwan, and the indecision and political infighting that is part and parcel of the democratization process, added a new dimension to U.S.-Taiwan defense dialogue and a new set of players on the Taiwan side.

During the 20 months since President Ma, who made a Taiwan-China détente the centerpiece of his campaign, took office, has made improving Taiwan-China relations a top priority. Cross-strait interaction has increased exponentially, reflecting Ma’s and the KMT’s attitudes that better Taiwan-China relations are critical to Taiwan’s economic growth and future prosperity. It also reflects their concern that Taiwan cannot keep pace with PRC military improvements. Their concern is fed, in part, by Washington’s unwillingness to provide Taiwan with the weapons it would need to do so and by the impact such purchases would have on Taiwan’s national budget in these hard economic times. The downturn in Taiwan’s economy resulting from the current global financial crisis will have immediate and longer-term impacts on Taiwan’s defense budget and its defense acquisition decisions [5].

During the 10 months since President Barack Obama took office, pressure on the U.S. economy brought about by the global economic crisis, unprecedented U.S. deficit spending, and challenges facing the United States in North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan have heightened his concern for good relations with China. Changes in the global strategic political, military and economic environment have led to further improvements in U.S.-China relations, further complicating U.S.-Taiwan defense relations. As of January 2009, China held $739.6 billion in U.S. treasury securities amounting to 24 percent of the U.S. national debt [6]. While China may be as equally dependent on the U.S. market as Washington is on Chinese foreign exchange reserves, keeping U.S.-China relations free of friction is a major objective of the Obama administration.

President Obama recently said that the relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century, demonstrating the great importance that the United States places on good relations with China and the two countries’ growing economic interdependence. In this context, President Obama will travel to China this November seeking to harmonize U.S. and PRC policy on a broad spectrum of political, economic and military issues. In preparation for his meetings with Chinese leaders, U.S. policy officials have conducted a review of U.S.-China and Taiwan policies. The nagging issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, no doubt, loomed large in that review. As Assistant Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell indicated in his confirmation hearings, the challenge for the United States is to facilitate the best environment that is conducive to Taiwan’s continuing peaceful engagement with China while providing Taiwan with suitable defensive weapons that afford it the confidence of U.S. support in its interactions with China [7]. How the Obama Administration plans to implement this strategy, however, remains unclear.

As has always been the case, there is much debate within the U.S. government about what constitutes “appropriate” defensive weapons and in what quantities the United States should provide them. China will argue, as will some in the United Sates, that it’s time to adhere to a strict interpretation of the August 1982 Communiqué, which has never been strictly interpreted by the United States in the 27 years that it has been in existence. Since April 2001, the U.S. government has largely ignored it. Nevertheless, China attaches great importance to the communiqué and no doubt will remind President Obama of the commitment made when the U.S. government signed it.

China may even try to convince President Obama, as it tried to convince President George W. Bush, that the time has come for a new communiqué—one which commits the United States to even greater reductions or even a moratorium in arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese leaders, who have interpreted the slow down in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in recent years, at least in part, as a response to their frequent demarches will continue to press what they believe has been a winning strategy.

Nevertheless, the United States remains bound by the provisions of the TRA [8]. As long as China maintains an array of forces and ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait it is difficult for Beijing to claim that it has only peaceful intentions toward Taiwan. Sooner or later, the Obama Administration will notify the sale of Blackhawk helicopters and additional Patriot PAC-3 missiles that the Bush administration held back and the Po Sheng (Broad Victory) C4I operations and sustainment program; to not notify these sales would constitute a major change in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan policy [9]. Taipei requires continued U.S. assistance with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to bolster its military capabilities across the board and to achieve an effective missile defense. It is unclear when or if the Obama administration will permit Taiwan to submit a Letter of Request for 66 new F-16C/D fighters. Taiwan cannot maintain a minimal air-defense capability in the coming years without them. The United States and Taiwan positions on diesel-electric submarines remain unclear. The Bush administration held back a notification on the design phase for an FMS program to provide Taiwan with submarines; now Taiwan appears ready to pursue a domestic submarine program with or without U.S. assistance (China Brief, April 16).

Uncertainty clouds the future. The United States will not abandon the core requirements of the TRA; Congress is not about to change the law and many senators and representatives remain strong supporters of Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Executive Branch has broad latitude in how it interprets and executes the TRA. Long delays in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan during the George W. Bush administration saw only modest pressure from the U.S. Congress. The outlook, therefore, given the current state of play in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations for future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is unclear. Simply stated, the closer U.S.-China relations become, the more difficult it is for the United States to resume major arms sales; and while the U.S. commitment to the TRA is always invoked by those who advocate them, a Congress dominated by the incumbent president’s party is more unlikely to hold hearings or put pressure on the president on Taiwan policy unless U.S.-China relations take a negative turn. Also uncertain is how hard the Ma administration will press the United States for arms purchases. Ma’s initial reluctance to request U.S. and foreign disaster relief in the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot due to his concern for how Beijing might react raises questions about how he will approach U.S. defense sales to Taiwan (Taipei Times, August 26).

China-Taiwan “reconciliation,” however, will likely not happen quickly. Despite recent improvements in Taiwan-China relations, fundamental differences between the systems of government in China and Taiwan, and a lack of broad-based public support in Taiwan for near-term reconciliation will inhibit progress (NowNews [Taiwan], October 20). Furthermore, no one should assume the gains made to date are irreversible. History never moves in a straight line.

While the above portends negative trends for U.S.-Taiwan defense relations, the outlook is not without positive aspects. U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation after 1979 has survived numerous difficult challenges. Taiwan’s first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in March 2009 sets forth ambitious goals for improving Taiwan’s military capabilities and transformation of the Taiwan armed forces to an all-volunteer force. It provides for a defensive posture the Obama administration can support while maintaining good relations with China so long as the United States stands firm on its obligations under the TRA. Assistant Secretary Campbell hit the nail on the head: the challenge for both the United States and Taiwan is to find the optimal environment that is conducive to Taiwan’s continuing peaceful engagement with China while providing Taiwan with suitable defensive weapons that afford it the confidence of U.S. support in its interactions with China. Responsibility for success rests with both Washington and Taipei.

Notes

1. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. VIII.
2. Following the resumption of US arms sales to Taiwan after the 1979 one-year moratorium, the US accepted Taiwan’s arms purchase requests once a year during an annual arms sales meeting. Beginning in April 2001, President Bush determined that Taiwan should be treated as a normal FMS customer and allowed Taiwan to submit Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Letters of Request (LORs) at any time.
3. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, October 10, 2001.
4. Arms sales notifications to Congress are posted at www.dsca.com.
5. U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, Second Quarter 2009, pp. 13-15.
6. Major Foreign holders of U.S. Treasury Securities (2008), U.S. Treasury Department, www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt.
7. U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, Second Quarter 2009, p. 15.
8. The Taiwan Relations act of 1979.
9. No administration official has ever questioned the propriety or appropriateness of these sales, it is just a matter of when they will be notified.

Taiwans Secret New Littoral Warship: “This article popped up today as the most interesting development for the Taiwan Navy in a long time. Here is a translation/summary courtesy of ID regular Altoid.

The 2010 defense budget was sent to the Legislative Yuan for approval, where the existence of a 900-ton coastal-defense missile-boat development program was inadvertently placed in the non-classified budget. This ship will have stealthed features, and will be the ROC Navy’s first multi-hull (catamaran) ship class, and will be equipped with eight Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missiles.

Taiwan’s mid- and small- warships were once very numerous 30 years ago, but by modern standards they are old with anemic firepower. The current main strength of Taiwan’s missile craft fleet is the Hai Ou class (Dvora), and 2 200-ton Lung Chiang class, one of which was built in Taiwan, with extremely poor capabilities, with long dock stays. The other ship also has had operational difficulties, including fire. Additionally, the more recent domestically-produced Ching Chiang class has not performed to initial expectations.

Because the PLAN has recently introduced the stealthy, high-speed Type 022 into mass-production and operational service, our missile systems will be hard-pressed to counter this, and our small and large warships will be severely threatened, and our military has been grasping for a solution.

Under the DPP administration, the navy designed the Kuang-Hwa VI class missile boat, but during the contract bidding process, the contractors used business and political connections to influence the selection committee, resulting in a unfair process and numerous corruption scandals. This delayed construction, and although the program is now in mass-production, it is already inferior to the Type 022.

To match communist China’s strength, the navy has secretly started a new development program, and has completed it’s twin-hull design, but not the systems loadout. The 2010 defense budget has allocations for the development of the necessary systems.

According to legislative sources, this new missile-craft will have a 900-ton displacement, will be used for coastal defense, but also have the flavor of larger missile corvettes, and be specifically designed to counter the Type 022. It will have a dual-hull, stealth capability, eight Hsiung Feng III antiship missiles, auto-cannons, with a total length of 40 meters, and a crew complement of 45.

The translation is correct, but it is possible the reporter has the details wrong. Maybe not though? What exactly does a 40 meter, 900 ton SWATH armed like a FAC with a rather large crew of 45 look like? At 900 tons, it sounds like the design trades speed for sea keeping.

I have discussed the Type 022 as the Chinese Streetfighter several times on the blog, but reading this article has me wondering if perhaps Taiwan has decided to counter with its own version of the proposed SEA LANCE. A creative SWATH idea sourced to the Naval Postgraduate School, SEA LANCE (26 MB PDF) was around 50 meters and 600 tons, and was designed with 51 VLS cells. That is about the only warship design I can think of similar to what the news article is discussing.

Considering this ship is about the same dimensions as a Type 022, which is 43 meters long and goes for about 220-250 tons; is it possible the extra weight comes from armor and this design represents a new theoretical approach to littoral warfare? We don’t usually put much emphasis in armor on ships anymore, and I’m not sure if armor would make a difference on a 900 ton ship.

With that said, there have been design ideas floating around to put a sort of double hulled, cage type armor around littoral ships to protect them from modern anti-ship missiles, and cover the cage with a stealth composite material to produce small stealthy missile corvettes that were survivable against a direct attack.

I’m just speculating. I look forward to seeing whether the size of this ship is reported accurately, and if so what it looks like. Building missile boats to fight missile boats strikes me as an odd approach, as helicopters are obviously the more effective approach. Still, Taiwan is smarter to build large numbers of littoral streetfighters than building more larger western frigates and destroyers, as the challenge they face is quantity not quality.

The image above is from the 26 MB report on the SEA LANCE cited in this entry.