http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30arms.html?hp

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration has approved an arms sales package to Taiwan worth more than $6 billion, a move that has enraged China and may complicate President Obama’s effort to enlist Beijing’s cooperation on Iran.

The administration deferred a decision on selling F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, administration officials said, but they pointedly added that they were not shutting the door to future F-16 sales.

The last time the United States sold F-16s to Taiwan was in 1992 under President George H. W. Bush. In response, China threatened to withdraw from international arms control talks and retaliated, many China experts contend, by selling medium-range missiles to Pakistan.

“We continue to study it,” a senior administration official said of the possible F-16 sales. “We will look at it from the perspective of what its impact would be on Taiwan’s air defense capability.”

The arms package announced Friday is primarily defensive, and includes 114 Patriot missiles worth $2.82 billion, 60 Black Hawk helicopters worth $3.1 billion and communications equipment for Taiwan’s F-16 fleet. The package also includes Harpoon missiles and mine-hunting ships, the Defense Cooperation Security Agency said in a statement.

The Chinese reaction was swift, and negative. China’s vice foreign minister, He Yafei, issued a diplomatic message to the State Department expressing his “indignation” over the pending sale, said Wang Baoding, the spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

“We believe this move endangers China’s national security and harms China’s peaceful reunification efforts,” Mr. Wang said in an interview. “It will harm China-U.S. relations and bring about a serious and active impact on bilateral communication and cooperation.”

China experts said that Beijing was likely to cut off military-to-military cooperation with the United States in retaliation, and that President Hu Jintao might boycott Mr. Obama’s planned nuclear security summit meeting in April.

The relationship between the two countries may deteriorate more if Mr. Obama meets, as he is expected to, with the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Mr. Obama put off meeting with the Dalai Lama last year to avoid angering Beijing before his visit to China in November, a decision that received strong criticism from human rights activists.

Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser, said Friday that the announcement should not “come as a surprise to our Chinese friends,” adding that the Obama administration was “bent on a new relationship with China that goes beyond arms sales to Taiwan.” Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, General Jones sought to play down the escalating tensions between the United States and China.

Those tensions have been on full display since Mr. Obama traveled to Beijing in November. While Mr. Obama and Mr. Hu promised to conduct regular exchanges and to work together on a number of issues, they did not reach an agreement on how to move forward on Western efforts to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Obama administration officials now say that they view China, not Russia, as the main stumbling block on efforts to get a Security Council resolution that would impose additional sanctions on Iran.

A month after Mr. Obama went to Beijing, China blocked his efforts to reach a meaningful climate change agreement in Copenhagen. China announced this month that it had tested the country’s first land-based missile defense system, a test that Chinese and Western analysts said was timed to convey Beijing’s annoyance over the expected American arms sales to Taiwan. Throughout January, Chinese state news media have produced a torrent of articles condemning the expected sale.

China views Taiwan as a breakaway province, separated since the civil war of the 1940s, and sees arms sales as interference in an internal matter. The American relationship with Taiwan is one of the most delicate diplomatic issues between Beijing and Washington.

The deal announced Friday is the second big arms sale to Taiwan in two years. When the Pentagon announced in October 2008, under the Bush administration, that it was selling Taiwan $6.6 billion worth of weapons, China froze military ties with the United States and did not resume the contacts until after Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Beijing last February.

On Wednesday, the Pentagon spokesman, Geoff Morrell, urged China not to take that tack again. Responding to a question from a reporter before the sale was announced, Mr. Morrell said that “this relationship is too important to go through the fits and starts that we have over the years, where every little bump in the road results in a breaking of communication and a suspension of dialogue.”

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are both expected to travel to Beijing this year for high-level talks. Administration officials said Friday that they hoped China did not retract those two invitations.

ASIAN DEFENCE

via Pakistan is working on new UAV with Chinese collaboration.

Federal Minister for Defence Production Abdul Qayyum has said that Pakistan has indigenously developed drones and is working in collaboration with China on more capable UAV. He said while talking to media on the occasion of inauguration of the construction work of first F-22 P Frigate for Pakistan Navy, at Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) today.

China Military Report

via Wonderful photos: PLA’s new carrier-based aircrafts attacked submarines.

Equipped with a new type of anti-submarine helicopters, some carrier-based aircraft regiment of the East China Sea Fleet of the Navy’s actively fighting and training methods of exploration. At present, fully formed anti-submarine warfare capability.

A carrier-based fleet of new helicopters

A carrier-based fleet of new helicopters.

Ship-borne helicopters and destroyers searching target.

Locks onto the target, rapid attack

Instant screen against underwater targets.

Ship-borne helicopter pilots were ordered to prepare attack.

Carrier-based aircrafts and destroyers coordinated anti-submarine training.

Destroyers fleet.

A new type of war submarine “surfaced”.

A new type of ship-borne anti-submarine helicopters to conduct night exercises

Tags: attack, China, East China Sea, Fleet, helicopter pilots, sea fleet, Ship-borne, target, Type, underwater targets, warfare capability

Changing China

via Can China help stabilise Pakistan?.

Tags: Afghanistan, Arunachal, Beijing, Central Asia, China, economy, finance ministry official, Forbidden City, foreign exchange reserves, Gwadar, gwadar port, help, India, Islamabad, Kashmir, lashkar e taiba, Mumbai, Pakistan, region, rivalry, South Asia, U.S., United States, Washington, Xinjiang, xinjiang region

China Military Power Mashup

via China’s CJ-20 Air Launched Cruise Missile to be operational with H-6 Bomber.

December.07 (China Military News reporting by Johnathan Weng) — CJ-20 ALCM, an air-launched version of CJ-10 Cruise missile, has been exposed in Chinese Internet. CJ-10 is the famous “ShaShoujian” weapon system and becomes the new rising star in the just ended grand parade of New China’s 60th National Day.

In the unleashed image, CJ-20 missile is being carried by one H-6H or H-6M bomber, which is the upgraded version of Russian Tu-16 bomber and constructs the main force of PLA air striking power. H-6H or H-6M bomber at least can carry 4 CJ=20 missiles and the latest and advanced H=6K bomber can carry 6 missiles to realize one possibility of China’s strategic attacking ability on U.S.’ Guam Base from inner land airspace.

It is believed that the specifications and performance of CJ-20 is very close to CJ-10. It cannot be sure whether Chinese people modify the missile for getting better stealth performance. PLA Air Force used to have KD-63, KD-88 and Russian KH-59 missiles to accomplish battle-level precisely striking. The upcoming operational of CJ-20 means PLA Air Force is going to be strategic bombing air power.

Tags: air, bomber, China, cruise missile, Force, grand parade, Guam Base, missile, new rising star, Power, strategic bombing, striking power, U.S.

China Military Power Mashup

via Next generation of Chinese tanks will only has 2 crew members.

December.08 (China Military News cited from Chinamil.com.cn) — “China will produce the next generation of main battle tank which is able to launch all-dimensional attacks and conduct all-directional self-protection with the number of tank crew reduced to 2,” said Mao Ming, director of China North Vehicle Research Institute (CNVRI) when receiving the interview of Tank and Armored Vehicle magazine.

Artist Imagination Picture of China’s next Generation of MBT

According to Mao Ming, the most advanced tank in active service in the PLA is type-99 main battle tank, which has 3 crew members after a feeding man is eliminated. He held that the next generation of main battle tank is likely to have only 2 crew members, i.e., a gunner and a driver sitting side by side.

Mao Ming said that the enhanced information ability will be the most important change to the next generation of tanks. The target detecting device in the tank is connected with a command-and-attack network with many command systems and sensors from which the tank will receive real time useful information about the target. The fire performance of the tank will be further expanded. Besides direct aiming and launching missiles, the tank also has indirect aiming and shooting ability. It can not only hit near-distance and far-distance objects, but also hit aerial targets. Generally speaking, the main battle tank of the next generation will combine the direct and indirect aiming to realize all-dimensional attacking.

Type 99G MBT in test

When it comes to the weight of the tank, Mao Ming pointed out that China’s main battle tank of the next generation should be lightweight with good strategic mobile capacity which meant rapid deployment in the combat area. The chassis system of the tank will be a general-purpose one with changeable and modularized loads for battles in the city or field battles in north China and in south China.

Tags: aerial targets, battle, China, crew, field battles, G MBT, Generation, main battle tank, Mao, Ming, north China, rapid deployment, South China, tank, tank crew

China Military Power Mashup

via Peru to buy Main Battle Tanks from China.

December.09 (China Military News cited from Reuters) — Peru is in talks to buy tanks (MBT-VT1A, see this post) from China and fighter planes from Brazil to replenish an “obsolete” military arsenal, officials said on Wednesday, just weeks after accusing Chile of starting an arms race.

President Alan Garcia has criticized Chile, which defeated Peru in the 19th century War of the Pacific, for negotiating the purchase of U.S. missiles and radar equipment.

Garcia has also tried to spearhead an anti-arms initiative in Latin America, where countries like Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia have been beefing up their armed forces.

“The government is in talks to acquire a fleet of tanks made in China to replace some of the obsolete units of the armed forces,” Defense Minister Rafael Rey told local radio.

“It’s about equipment replacement — not about entering an incessant arms race,” Prime Minister Javier Velasquez said on RPP radio.

Peru said Super Tucano planes it buys from Brazil’s Embraer would be used to combat cocaine trafficking in remote parts of the Andes and Amazon jungle.

Peru’s government, which hopes to replace Soviet-era tanks acquired in the 1970s, did not say how much it would spend on the new equipment.

Chilean Defense Minister Francisco Vidal has said any U.S. equipment that Chile buys would cost much less than a recent $650 million estimate provided by the Pentagon.

Vidal said potential purchases of missiles and Sentinel radar systems would not upset the military balance in South America.

Chile’s armed forces have benefited from years of windfall copper earnings due to a law that entitles them to 10 percent of state copper giant Codelco’s sales. The government has sent a bill to Congress that aims to scrap the Codelco payment.

Tags: amazon jungle, Andes, Brazil, Chile, China, cocaine trafficking, Colombia, Defense Minister Francisco Vidal, Defense Minister Rafael Rey, equipment, government, Latin America, main battle tanks, Military, Pacific, Peru, President Alan Garcia, Prime Minister Javier Velasquez, race, radio, radio peru, sentinel radar, South America, U.S., Venezuela, Vidal

China Military Power Mashup

via Crazy! China launches two Spy Satellites in seven days.

December. 13 (China Military News cited from Xinhuanet) — China will launch a remote-sensing satellite, ” Yaogan VIII” in the coming days from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in northern Shanxi Province, the center said Sunday.

“Yaogan VII” was launched last Wednesday from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center

The satellite would be sent into the space aboard a Long March 4C carrier rocket, the center said.

Also on board is China’s first public-welfare mini satellite, “Hope I,” which will be used for the country’s young people to experience aerospace science and technology.

Currently, the satellites and the rocket are in good condition, according to the center.

Its predecessor, “Yaogan VII,” was launched Wednesday from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in northwestern Gansu Province.

Tags: Center, China, gansu province, jiuquan satellite launch center, Launch, Military, northern Shanxi Province, northwestern Gansu Province, Satellite, satellite launch center, taiyuan satellite launch center, xinhuanet china, Yaogan

China Military Power Mashup

via China’s New Naval Electronic Surveillance Ship Launched in Shanghai.

December.14 (China Military News reporting by Johnathan Weng) — Recently, a new electronic surveillance ship was launched from one shipyard (probably is No.437 shipyard) of the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding Company. The ship is designed by No.708 Institute of CSSC (China State Shipbuilding Corporation). This ship is designed for collecting electronic intelligence (ELINT) off the coast of other countries. This ship is believed to be the successor of previous Type 851 electronic surveillance and missile tracking ship. At present no armament can be found and a huge spherical dome is being built. And it is very strange that one facility like band stand radar installed on the top of the bridge. The ship’s displacement is estimated to be over 6,000 tonnes when being comparing with nearby cargo ship.

Tags: China, electronic intelligence, electronic surveillance, elint, hudong, Military, Shanghai, ship, Shipbuilding, shipbuilding company, shipyard, Surveillance

China Brief – The Jamestown Foundation

via Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Balance in the East China Sea.

On October 19, Legislator and Chairman of Congressional Caucus for the opposition party DPP (Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party) Chai Trong-rong publicly accused the Ma Ying-jeou administration of providing China with sensitive undersea survey data around Taiwan. Legislator Chai maintained that the information, which he alleged the Ma administration supplied, was germane to China’s May 11 submission of the preliminary survey findings on the outer limits of its continental shelf to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLNS) on the East China Sea. The government denied the allegation (Taipei Times, October 20). Such charges highlight the deep-seated suspicion held by the opposition party toward the Kuomintang (KMT)-led government. Yet whether Chai’s accusation proves to be true or false, the Ma administration has indeed taken a very different approach than the previous administration toward China and Japan in maritime issues related to the East China Sea and Taiwanese-claimed territorial waters.

For instance, the Taiwanese-media recently disclosed that the Ma administration is no longer claiming the territorial waters around Kinmen and Matsu, two small islands that have long been part of its frontline defense against China (Liberty Times, November 23). These two major cases constitute a growing body of evidence signaling that a major shift is underway in Taiwan’s strategic orientation, particularly in its maritime domain. Taiwan, an island strategically located at the crossroad of the western Pacific Ocean and Continental Asia, pivots on the sea-lane of communications (SLOCs) between Northeast and Southeast Asia. Taiwan’s strategic orientation, whether it folds in line with continental Asia or maritime Asia, has the potential to fundamentally alter the strategic landscape in the western Pacific.

China Becomes Taiwan’s Partner in the East China Sea

Mending relations with China has been the cornerstone of President Ma’s foreign policy. Throughout his political career, Ma has consistently advocated that “cross-Strait relation outweighs all other Taiwan’s external relations” (Liberty Times, June 10, 2008). Indeed, since his electoral victory in the March 2008 presidential election, cross-Strait relations have thawed considerably. This may be attributable to President Ma’s acceptance of the so-called “92 consensus” as the basis on which to resume official dialogue with the PRC. In his inauguration speech as KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) chairman on October 18, President Ma stated that the “92 consensus” means that both sides accept the “one China principle,” (Economic Times, October 19), yet both sides are free to interpret what “China” means [Republic of China or People's Republic of China] (Hong Kong Central News Agency, October 18).

In addition to increasing official-contacts between Taipei and Beijing, cross-Strait cooperation has also expanded into strategic areas. One of these strategic areas involves cooperation in the East China Sea. Chinese National Petroleum (CNP), a Taiwanese state-owned oil company, has intensified its joint oil-exploration cooperation efforts in the South China and East China Sea with China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a PRC government-owned oil company. In a 2002 research study conducted by a KMT-affiliated think tank, National Policy Foundation, the author called for closer cooperation with China in the areas of oil exploration in the midline of the Taiwan Strait. Three days after his inauguration, President Ma reportedly ordered an interagency study on the possibility of Taiwan-China Petroleum cooperation. According to the National Security Council’s (NSC) original planning, future focus will be on cross-Strait cooperation for oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and other offshore resources through setting up a cross-Strait joint venture (China Times, October 26, 2008). Yin Chi-min, then the Taiwanese Minister of Economy, stressed that one of the aims for accelerating cross-Strait petroleum cooperation is to enhance Taiwanese energy security (TTV.com.tw, March 16).

According to a senior Taiwanese official in the NSC, one purpose for Taiwan-China petroleum cooperation is to balance against Japan and Vietnam oil and gas exploration activities in the East and South China Sea, respectively (China Times, October 26). Indeed, cross-Strait cooperation in these areas could ameliorate the general atmosphere across the Taiwan Strait and improve political confidence on both sides as well. Implicit in this cooperation, however, is that China—Taiwan’s primary strategic adversary—is being framed by the current Taiwanese government as a strategic partner for its energy security against Vietnam and Japan, countries that Taiwan has previously had friendly relations with under the previous administration.

Taiwan-Japan Tension Increased After Ma Took Office

Taiwan-Japan relations represent another example of significant change in Taiwan foreign relations, one which is altering the regional dynamics. Despite President Ma’s claim that 2009 marks the year of “Special Partnership of Taiwan and Japan,” (Central News Agency, January 20) less than a month after taking office, a Taiwanese fishing boat entered disputed waters near Senkaku Island /Diaoyutai and the event quickly escalated into an all-out diplomatic fistfight between Taipei and Tokyo (China Post, September 1). Then Premier Liu Chao-hsuan publicly threatened to use military force if necessary to uphold Taiwan’s sovereignty claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai area (Taiwan News, June 16). Taiwan’s chief representative to Japan was recalled to protest against Japan. On June 16, Taipei also dispatched coast guard ships to guard a civilian fishing boat that entered the disputed area to proclaim sovereignty (Central News Agency, June 17). At the same time, Jian Yu, the spokesperson for China’s ministry of foreign affairs, restated the Chinese position that Diaoyutai/Senkaku is part of Chinese territory and expressed deep concern and anger toward Japan about sinking the Taiwanese ship. He also demanded that Japan stop its “illegal activity around this area” (Wenwei Pao, June 18).

As Taiwan-Japan relations continued to deteriorate into a state of diplomatic cold war after the fishing vessel incident, the Japanese Defense Ministry confirmed a Tokyo Shinbum report that it was studying plans to deploy self-defense forces on Yonagoni-Jima, which lies 67 miles (108 kilometers) from the east coast of Taiwan (Taiwan News Online, July 4). In response to this report, the Ma administration asked Tokyo to exercise self-restraint. The proposal to base military units at a time when cross-Strait tension was at an all-time low sparked a lot of speculation. Some analysts pointed out that such a move by Japanese Self Defense Forces indicates that Tokyo’s views toward Taiwan are changing, and that the island may now become a target that Japan may need to defend “against,” rather than to defend “with” (FTV English News, July 3; Taipei Times, July 6). According to the Japanese Defense Ministry spokesperson, “the [Japanese] government is currently studying this military deployment and that it will be added to the nation’s basic self-defense plans scheduled to be revised at the end of this year” (United Daily News [Taiwan], July 3).

The Collateral Damage of Ma’s Sino-centric Foreign Policy

The opposite directions in which Taiwan-China and Taiwan-Japan relations appear to be moving raises questions about the Ma administration’s capability to wage its “comprehensive diplomacy.”

Proponents of Ma’s strategy explain that this hurdle in bilateral relations is a normal development for every incoming administration; especially since the ruling-party has been in opposition for the previous eight years. This worsening development between Taiwan and Japan can be attributed to the inexperience of the incoming new government, the lack of “Japan hands” within the administration, and the deep-seated “anti-Ma” complex among some Japanese political elites. According to this school of thought, the tension will eventually go away as the administration gradually gets familiar with all the nuts and bolts of Japan affairs. It can also be argued that lowering tension across the Taiwan Strait fits Japan’s national interest as well, thus there should be no reason for Japan to oppose Ma’s foreign policy since Japan’s basic national interest is fundamentally met due to Ma’s action.

Yet, critics of Ma’s strategy believe this development is the direct result of Ma Ying-Jeou’s own “great Chinese nationalism complex,” which sees Japan through the eyes of China, rather than viewing it from the angle of Taiwanese national interest (Liberty Times, June 22, 2008). In terms of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute, Ma’s actions reneged from the tacit understanding between Taipei and Tokyo established during the previous Lee and Chen administrations. This understanding is based on a set of unstated protocols that in the event of a conflict Taipei will not send its governmental ship into the troubled area; that Taiwan will adhere to the principle of non-violence; and that this issue will remain a strictly bilateral matter between Taiwan and Japan. At the height of the Lien-Ho fishing boat tension in June 2008, between then-Premier Liu’s war talk, Ma’s pending decision to send Taiwanese naval vessels to escort civilian fishing boats entering the disputed water (Taipei Times, June 17), and a KMT legislator’s suggestion to “unite with China against Japan” (lianzhong zhiri), the Ma government broke all of the cardinal precedents of managing Taiwan-Japan relations over the East China Sea issue. Taiwan-Japan relations have not been the same since.

From the Taiwan Strait to the East China Sea: Changing Strategic Balance

The first 18 months of Ma’s administration have altered the long-standing strategic balance in the East China Sea. In spite of the territorial dispute between Taiwan and Japan, Tokyo could always count on Taipei to be a cooperative partner. Under the previous two administrations, at the very least, Taipei would not take Beijing’s side when Japan-China disputes flared up. Now that the Taiwanese government appears to be changing its position by taking a pro-China stance, Japan will face opposition not only from its Western front, but also from its Southern front if the East China Sea dispute flares up again.

This development could also pose a strategic challenge to the U.S.-Japan alliance. If Taiwan is no longer willing to play a silent but supportive role in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, it may have to prepare for the possibility that Taipei will forge a common position with China in some cases; for instance, in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku island dispute and cross-Strait oil/gas joint exploration in the East China Sea. Thus, the alliance’s capability and freedom of action will be complicated by the uncertainty in Taipei’s actions. Yet, an all-out “Chiawan” (China-Taiwan) cooperation seems unlikely in the near future, but the fundamentals of the East China Sea strategic equation are undergoing long-term changes. It seems clear from President Ma’s policy announcements, which prioritize cross-Strait relations above all other external relations, that as long as Ma remains in office, lowering tensions across the Taiwan Strait will be followed by increasing strategic uncertainty in the East China Sea.

Notes

1. Guo Boyao, “Studying the Development of Taiwan’s Oil Industry from Cross-Strait Oil Exploration,” National Policy Foundation Research Report, May 29, 2002.
2. This is based on author’s personal experience dealing with the Taiwan-Japan issue working at Taiwan’s representative office in Japan 2000-2003.

Tags: administration, Beijing, China, cooperation, democratic progressive party, East China Sea, jamestown foundation, Japan, Jian Yu, June, news, oil, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan, President Ma, Senkaku Island, South China, South China Sea, Taipei, taipei times, Taiwan, Taiwan Strait, Tokyo, Vietnam, western pacific ocean, Yin Chi-min

China Air and Naval Power

via The state of China/Russia military cooperation.

Today, I read this article by a Russian paper regarding the military cooperation between China and Russia. I think it really does a great job of explaining why there haven’t been a major deal recently and why it probably would not happen anytime soon. The important point is that this article didn’t dwell on the so called pirating efforts of China against Russian hardware, so it was able to explore some of the major reasons why nothing is going on. It clearly identifies IL-76 and S-400 as the 2 major items that China would most likely want from Russia at the current time and why they are not coming through.

With respect to the last paragraph, I think the idea of pirating will be a problem for a while, because the two sides really can’t agree on what constitute pirating. The copyright laws in the two countries are actually not the same. So even though they signed an agreement, I’m not sure it will work out as the Russians want.

The crisis in the Russian defence industry is hindering the
development of military-technical cooperation with the Middle Kingdom.

Military cooperation between Russia and China in the weapons business
sphere, it appears, is experiencing a severe crisis. This is shown by
the results of the visit to Russia by the Chinese government
delegation headed by Colonel General Guo Boxiong, deputy chairman of
the PRC’s Central Military Commission, that concluded last Friday [27
November].

General Guo Boxiong (on the left) rubbed shoulders with Dmitriy
Medvedev but apparently left Moscow empty handed.

The military leader from China came to discuss prospects for military-
technical cooperation (VTS) between the two countries. President
Vladimir Medvedev received Gou Boxiong. He noted that “a firm
partnership is developing between the two countries, and it is based
upon a coincidence of our basic interests.” The day before, in the
presence of Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and Federal Service
for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) Director Mikhail Dmitriyev,
Russia’s leader met for a long time behind closed doors in Barvikha
with the Chinese guests. On 24 November the delegation from China was
at the Kapustin Yar proving ground in Astrakhan Oblast where new
developments in prospective armament models were demonstrated for it.
And the next day [25 November] the 14th session of the Russian-Chinese
Joint Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation (SMK) was held in
Moscow under the chairmanship of Anatoliy Serdyukov. According to
Irina Kovalchuk, the defence minister’s press secretary, at the
session “the sides expressed satisfaction with the state of bilateral
military-technical cooperation.”

Nevertheless, it is striking that neither the Russian nor the Chinese
sides expected the present meeting to end in the signing of any sort
of documents about weapons purchases. Foreshadowing the SMK session,
Mikhail Dmitriyev stated that all areas of bilateral collaboration
“will be examined” at it: aircraft building, engines, ships, PVO [air
defence] systems, and armoured equipment. Although “the adoption of
any breakthrough decisions or the signing of any contracts is not
expected.” Why it is “not expected” is completely understandable.
Beijing already has bought everything that is possible in Moscow, and
it will produce the greater share of weapons by itself. And all of the
new types of weapons that the PRC needs are only at the development
stage in Russia, or else there are problems in producing them.

For example, the last “breakthrough contract” between Moscow and
Beijing was concluded as far back as 2005 in Sochi. At issue were
deliveries to the PRC by 2010 of 34 Il-76 military-transport airplanes
and four Il-78 refueling airplanes, at a total cost of more than one
billion dollars. But, as is well known, the Chkalov Tashkent Aircraft
Production Association (TAPOiCH, Uzbekistan), where the airplanes
mentioned are produced, defaulted and the contract was broken. As
sources in the FSVTS reported to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the question of
buying heavy military transport airplanes also was raised during the
present round of Russian- Chinese contracts, but Moscow was not able
to make the Chinese comrades happy in any way.

We would note that during the time of Guo Boxiong’s visit to the
Russian Federation President Medvedev visited Ulyanovsk. The media
paid attention to the dressing down that the president gave to the
military in that city in connection with the explosions at the Navy’s
No 31 Arsenal. Meanwhile, having arrived in Ulyanovsk Dmitriy Medvedev
immediately left the airport and headed first of all to the Aviatstar
SP [joint venture] aircraft-building plant, to which the production of
the Il-76 will be transferred from Tashkent. Together with others of
the aviation enterprise’s innovations, they also showed him the plans
for a new aircraft (Il-476) based on the Il-76 airplane, where the
newest aviation navigation and control systems are used and where in
addition to everything the configuration of the wing is changed.

On the same day in Ulyanovsk, in addition to a session of the State
Council for Nanoinnovation [Gossovet po nanonovatsiyam: According to
the Kremlin website, Medvedev participated in a session of the State
Committee for Questions of Innovative Development of Russia's
Transportation System in Ulyanovsk on 24 November], a session of the
board of directors of the Amalgamated Aircraft Manufacturing
Corporation (OAK) was held under the chairmanship of Deputy Premier
Sergey Ivanov to determine plans for Russian aviation. Notable among
these is a plan for “the programme for producing the Il-476 to be set
in motion at the Ulyanovsk aircraft plant: the airplane is expected to
be rolled out in 2010 and will be tested in 2011.” Thus it was
demonstrated to the PRC that Russia is developing modern aviation
technology, but the Chinese still will not see the new military
transport airplane very soon. Judging from present Russian experience,
testing the airplane will take a long time.

Besides this, the Russian Air Force is in great need of these
airplanes. The same thing could be said about other new Russian
defence industry developments. Let us say that on 24 November at the
Russian Air Force’s Kapustin Yar proving ground the Chinese admired
the S-400 surface-to-air missile (ZRS) system. But it was hinted to
them that they are unlikely to that soon either. In the first place,
the Russian armed forces will have to be equipped with it, and in the
second place – and perhaps this is the most essential point – the
shortcomings that the S-400 has must be eliminated. Air Force
Commander in Chief Colonel General Aleksandr Zelin unambiguously
hinted at this on 26 November. According to him, the tactical-
technical characteristics that are set for this surface-to-air missile
system “still have not been completely obtained”. Therefore, the
general says, together with the PVO Almaz-Antey concern it is still
necessary to carry out a great deal of work in order for “the
necessary results to be achieved”.

The Chinese were shown other new types of weapons, but Russia does not
want to sell them “simply for the sake of selling them”. From all
accounts, Moscow wants to establish gentlemen’s agreements with
Beijing in the area of military-technical cooperation in order to
avoid pirate copying of our technology. In this connection one can
recall the scandal fanned by the media about the fact that Moscow is
thinking about refusing to sell Beijing a major part of the SU-33
fighter out of fears that the Chinese will illegally copy this
airplane as they had done earlier with the Su-27. Vyacheslav Dzirkaln,
deputy director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military- Technical
Cooperation, thinks that the problem is a real one: “Last year we
signed an agreement on the protection of intellectual property, and I
hope that it will help us solve problems in disputes connected with
the illegal copying of our weapons.”

Tags: Beijing, Boxiong, central military commission, China, china russia, cooperation, defence, Director Mikhail Dmitriyev, Dmitriy Medvedev, Dmitriy Medvedev, government delegation, Irina Kovalchuk, Mikhail Dmitriyev, Minister Anatoliy, Moscow, PRC, President Medvedev, President Vladimir Medvedev, Russia, russian defence industry, Sochi, Tashkent, time, vladimir medvedev

China Military Power Mashup

via Russia’s NPO Saturn will supply D-30KP-2 engines to China.

December.04 (China Military News reporting by Johnathan Weng) — The first batch of D-30KP-2 production of NPO Saturn, made under the contract between Rosoboron-export and China, has been handed over the Chinese customer and the rest part will be transferred to China before the end of this year. Signing of Acceptance of eight engines of the first batch was held at NPO Saturn on Nov. 30, 2009

The Chinese delegation also noted with satisfaction the rapid development of enterprise in the creation of modern aviation turbofan engine with new high-tech equipment.

The subsequent contract of Saturn plans to maintain the activities of production and delivery of another four batches of D-30KP-2, which the company intends to complete in 2011. According to resource fro NPO Saturn, the second, third and fourth acceptance of D-30KP-2 will be respectively scheduled February, May and October 2010, and last part will fe finished at the beginning of 2011

In general the contract, which made between Rosoboron-export and China, entered into force in April 2009. NPO Saturn is obliged to put the Chinese customer 55 D-30KP-2 engines prior to the 2012 Contract and also provides technical support during the warranty period .

Program of Action “NPO” Saturn “is the creation of a national company, globally competitive gas turbine products and technologies

Saturn provides marketing, design, production, sales and after sales support of gas turbine technology in three main areas: military programs, civil aviation programs, energy engineering program.

It is usually believed that these D-30KP-2 engine will be installed on Chinese Air Force H-6K bombers and IL-76MD Transporter fleet..

Tags: China, contract, gas turbine technology, Military, NPO, npo saturn, production, Rosoboron-export, Russia, Saturn, turbine products, turbofan engine

Naval Open Source INTelligence

via US Admiral: China to have first aircraft carrier by ’15.

Even as the delivery schedule of the Gorshkov aircraft carrier for the Indian Navy remains uncertain, China is likely to have its first operational aircraft carrier by 2015, a top US Admiral in charge of the US Pacific Command (PACOM) has said.

“I think they are making a strong effort to advance the idea of making an aircraft carrier operational between now and 2015,” said Admiral Robert F Willard, whose area of responsibility covers both the Chinese and Indian Navies.

However, the officer said aircraft carrier operations would require a lot of training and effort.

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Alert 5 – Military Aviation News

via Subsidiary of J-10 maker buys European aerospace manufacturing company.

Xi’an Aircraft Industry, a subsidiary of China’s state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC, has bought a major stake in Austrian aircraft parts maker Future Advanced Composite Components AG.

Tags: aerospace manufacturing, aircraft, Aviation, aviation industry, aviation news, China, european aerospace, Industry, maker, military aviation, Subsidiary

Alert 5 – Military Aviation News

via Former commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet says DDG-1000 best to counter Chinese ASBM.

Retired Adm. James A. Lyons, former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, says the DDG-1000 destroyer is the best ship for the U.S. Navy to counter China’s new anti-ship ballistic missile.

Tags: Adm. James A, Alert, asbm, Aviation, aviation news, ballistic missile, China, commander, ddg 1000, Fleet, Military, pacific fleet, u s navy, U.S., U.S. Pacific

Naval Open Source INTelligence

via Countering Beijing’s new weapon.

According to the incoming commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Robert F. Willard, “In the past decade or so, China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability and capacity every year. They’ve grown at an unprecedented rate in those capabilities.”

Nowhere is this more evident than in China’s development of an anti-ship ballistic missile capability, specifically designed to target U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups that are the principle obstacle to China’s expansion goals in the Western Pacific.

On Nov. 19, Bloomberg News reported that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) has disclosed that China is close to fielding a new anti-ship ballistic missile. Some experts say this weapon system could be a game-changer by creating “no-go zones” for U.S. aircraft carriers.

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Tags: Adm. Robert F, aircraft carrier strike groups, Beijing, capability, China, incoming commander, intelligence, missile, missile capability, Naval, office of naval intelligence, ONI, open source intelligence, Read, U.S., U.S. Pacific, weapon, Western Pacific, Willard

World Politics Review: Articles

via Can China Deliver in Pakistan?.

The success or failure of President Barack Obama’s new Afghanistan strategy will depend on numerous international factors, but few loom larger than Pakistan. However, Washington has little credibility and leverage in Pakistan, where mistrust of the U.S. runs high. Enter China. Pakistan’s instability jeopardizes critical Chinese interests, and the time has never been more ripe for Beijing to lean on its longstanding ally….

Tags: Afghanistan, barack obama, Beijing, China, chinese interests, failure, international factors, mistrust, Pakistan, Politics, Review, success, U.S., Washington, world, world politics

East Asia Forum

via Thinking about the Asia Pacific Community.

Authors: Hadi Soesastro (CSIS, Jakarta) and Peter Drysdale (ANU, Canberra)

The idea that regional architecture in Asia and the Pacific is not up to the tasks it now needs to serve has been around for some time. It has been inspired in part by worries about the untidiness in the competing structures — across the Pacific, of APEC, and within East Asia, of ASEAN +3 and the East Asia Summit (EAS). There has also been a hankering after ‘robust’ regional institutions modelled on the arrangements in Europe or North America, however unsuited they are to Asia Pacific circumstances.

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What is different about the thinking that led to Prime Minister Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community proposal is that these worries are incidental to its main strategic motivation. The Rudd idea is grounded in the reality of the big shifts taking place in the structure of regional and world power. These shifts in the structure of power have two main implications.

First, Asia’s growth is changing the structure of the world economy and shifting global economic power, and ultimately, strategic weight towards Asia, in particular China and India. Economic and political changes in Asia and the Pacific challenge the primacy of some dimensions of American power. These developments underline the gap in the framework for regional political and security dialogue in Asia and the role that such dialogue could play in helping to manage the long-term change in the structure of Asian economic and political power and political security relations between Asia and America.

Second, the scale of Asia’s impact on the global economy means that there is urgency in energising regional efforts to deliver on Asia’s global responsibilities – in the financial and macro-economy, in trade policy and on climate change – and how that might be assisted through regional structures.

Until the collapse of world financial markets and world trade in the global financial crisis, the East Asian region, including Australia, was preoccupied with managing all aspects of the China boom – the pressure on energy, resource and food markets, the macroeconomic pressures, the looming foreign direct investment and commercial presence – and beginning to think about its long-term political consequences. India too was more and more caught up in the wave. All was premised on the continuing strength of North American and European markets.

East Asian economies should have been more conscious of their role on the world stage and the need to reposition quickly to manage the global system consequences of their own economic success and the dangers presented to its sustainability that the huge imbalances had created on the way. East Asia bore no responsibility for America’s squandering the beneficence of East Asia’s success – the apparently never-ending supply of cheap credit negligently guarded by the private and public custodians of the developed world’s financial system. But in this and in many other global system-making or system-destroying economic and political affairs, East Asia had significant prudential responsibility and it failed collectively at every stage to exercise it.

The reason for this failure is simple.

Despite the emergence of East Asia as a major economic force in the world – China, Japan and the rest of East Asia through to Australia and New Zealand reaching out to India – the East Asian economies collectively could not step up to the mark because regional structures were still not up to the task of effective global participation. The stage was still set for the wrong play – reactive responses to regionalism in other parts of the world, the trivia of regional FTAs and ‘mickey mouse’ financial cooperation – and there was no platform on which to perform globally.

In East Asia, like elsewhere in the world, the risks that we now face in recovery from the global financial crisis, not only economically but also politically, are a consequence of failure in the architecture of governance, including regional architecture, that frustrated a coherent East Asian and international response to the big problems of the day in their global context.

The global financial crisis and the emergence of the G20 has changed all this dramatically and propelled the G20’s Asian members to assume a new role and their proper responsibilities in managing the world economic order. ASEAN is the fulcrum of Asian cooperation arrangements, including APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS) but, with the rise of the bigger powers in Asia, and the G20, this is changing.

How can regional architecture be restructured to relate effectively to the new global arrangements?

The starting point is to understand that, while they may have failed to connect Asia’s regional with its growing global interests and responsibilities and they have other weaknesses, the regional arrangements we have in place are huge assets in going forward. APEC is entrenched as the primary trans-Pacific arrangement. ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit have assumed an important role in developing the Asian regional agenda. APEC, in its first twenty years, has provided a workable strategy in trade and economic diplomacy in East Asia and the Pacific supporting policies of liberalisation and structural reform, organised around the principle of open regionalism (a strategy well suited to the development, objectives and diversity of the Asia Pacific region). But after the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis, these regional arrangements (APEC, ASEAN +3, ASEAN+6) must now relate more strategically to the global arrangements (the G20 group). And there is a whole new political and security agenda to navigate within the Asia Pacific region.

Clearly, the Asia Pacific Community idea needs to relate to these established regional structures – APEC and East Asian arrangements – if it is to be both accepted and serve its underlying political-security purpose. It will only be worthwhile and practical if it limits dialogue to the major players. Hence, although it cannot encompass all APEC’s membership, or all the membership of EAS, a dialogue on political and security affairs needs to represent both as they are presently constituted. It needs to link to, be coordinated with, and draw on the base of all of the established trans-Pacific and East Asian arrangements.

While none of the existing regional institutions addresses all of the key dimensions of regional cooperation that they now need to – providing a collective forum for regional leaders to address the full range of regional and global issues; dealing effectively with the consequences of economic integration, particularly its trade and investment but also its financial and macro-economic dimensions; addressing issues of political change and security; and educating the public and opinion leaders about the region – nor should any one organisation need to perform all these roles. Each of these forums has evolved to serve some or other of these roles and they can all make an input across the range of issues that are now important.

This points to the need for a new heads of government meeting that transcends APEC and EAS (encompassing the Rudd and Hatoyama proposals) that can address the full range of regional and global issues, including issues that might arise in APEC, EAS, ARF or other regional forums and feed into the G20 and other global processes. This summit could eventually constitute an Asia Pacific Council, underpinning the continued development of the regional community. It would not need its own secretariat but draw on APEC and the ASEAN-based groups to develop issues for consideration.

There may be sensitivities in creating a new summit involving a limited number of countries, the ‘larger’ players in Asia and the Pacific. But so long as it is structured so that it is representative of all the regional arrangements, these sensitivities need not be important. The most practical proposal and most logical starting point is that this summit should begin by including the Asia Pacific members of the G20, and meet adjunct to the APEC summit. A dialogue among these countries does not entail creating an additional institution as G20 leaders will continue to meet beyond the current financial crisis, encompass the core players in APEC and EAS and meet in conjunction with the annual APEC summit . These are all  important considerations in taking the next steps towards realising vision of an Asia Pacific and East Asian Community.

The clear message is that ‘no one wants more meetings’ and that there is ‘no appetite for additional institutions.’ But there is strong support for developing more effective alignment of regional strategic purpose, a sentiment that is at the core of the idea of an Asia Pacific Community.

If this is an idea that seeks to anticipate and shape our regional political and economic future, it is an idea that cannot be put on hold, take a decade to implement or wait until the United States signs on to EAS, an ASEAN-based, primarily Asian-oriented and still nascent grouping.

The next APEC meeting in Japan, provides an excellent opportunity to convene a side-dialogue of this group, including India, on these issues, likely just prior to the G20 meetings in Seoul, to lay the foundations for a representative Asia Pacific Council that can give leadership to taking the Asia Pacific Community idea forward.

Dr Hadi Soesastro is a senior economist with CSIS in Jakarta and Peter Drysdale is Emeritus Professor in the Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University. The original version of this essay was submitted as background to the Asia Pacific Community Conference held in Sydney at the instigation of Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, 3-5 December 2009.

Tags: America, architecture, ASEAN, Asia, asia pacific community, Australia, Canberra, China, East Asia, east asia summit, east Asian, Europe, global financial crisis, Hadi Soesastro, India, Jakarta, Japan, New Zealand, North America, North American, Pacific, Peter Drysdale, Power, Prime Minister Rudd, Rudd, security dialogue, structure, world

via ‘China building airstrips along LAC’, govt says no need to worry (The Times of India).

With reports suggesting China was building over two dozen new airstrips along the Line of Actual Control, Pallam Raju said there was no need to be worried as India was adequately strengthening itself…..

Tags: actual control, airstrips, Building, China, china building, dozen, govt, India, LAC, Times, times of india

China Space News

via Chang’e-1 Has Blazed A New Trail In China’s Deep Space Exploration.

Shanghai, China (SPX) Dec 02, 2009 – A huge amount of scientific data have been accumulated by the CE-1 lunar orbiter. Using laser altimeter data, Jinsong Ping and Qian Huang et al obtained improved 3D lunar topography, and based on this, they had made new discoveries (such as impact basins and volcanic deposit highlands) of some ancient topographic characteristics on the lunar surface….

Tags: Blazed, Chang, China, impact basins, lunar, lunar orbiter, lunar topography, New Trail, news, qian huang, Shanghai, Space, volcanic deposit