Fleets in Being via informationdissemination.net
By chinasecurityblog. Filed in China |
Fleets in Being: “Interesting post from UltimaRatioReg:
When built, Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat. Slightly larger than her more famous sister, Bismarck, KMS Tirpitz displaced more than 43,000 tons. She was 824 feet long, armed with eight 38-cm (15”) guns, and had exceeded 31 knots on trials. The British had tried desperately to destroy her before she was even completed, and between the RAF and Royal Navy, many air, surface, and subsurface attacks had been only moderately successful, and had often paid a heavy cost for their efforts….It has been estimated that the “fleet in being”, of which Tirpitz was the centerpiece and eventually the only significant unit, tied down ten times its own combat power in Royal Navy battleships, carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. Many of these powerful warships were desperately needed in other theaters of war, most notably in November/December of 1941 in the Pacific.
First a technical quibble; the idea that Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat can’t be allowed to sit uncontested. Debates on the relative capabilities of WWII battleships are about as helpful as arguing about the merits of Lennon vs. McCartney, but advocating for Tirpitz is about as sensible as defending the idea that Ringo was the most important Beatle. She was large, yes, but inferior to foreign contemporaries in many respects, including armor, main armament, and anti-aircraft protection. Had Tirpitz encountered a North Carolina or South Dakota class battleship, or even a King George V on equal terms, there’s no question I’d rather be on the Allied vessel; recall that Prince of Wales, even crippled by teething problems in her main turrets, inflicted more damage on Bismarck than she received at the Battle of Denmark Strait.
As to the ‘fleet in being’ as purely historical concept, the ‘10 times’ figure seems pretty hyperbolic, especially in reference to fall 1941. First, the German Navy had several major units in addition to Tirpitz (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau both remained operational, as did two pocket battleships and three heavy cruisers) which in fact limited the number of warships the British could deploy to the Pacific, but by nothing approaching a factor of ten. The only fast battleships that the RN had, apart from Repulse and PoW, were King George V, Duke of York, and Renown. The slower R, Queen Elizabeth, and Nelson class ships were effective in the Med, and as convoy escorts, but were thought to be of limited utility in either the Pacific or in the role of commerce raider chaser. Thus, the RN didn’t have a tremendous advantage over the forces available to Germany; indeed, to confirm advantage the USN deployed Washington and North Carolina to the Atlantic for the first six months of US participation. So while it’s true that the Allies maintained heavy forces in the ETO because of the German units (and battleships, of course, aren’t the entire story), it’s important not to overstate the leverage that the Germans earned from their ‘fleet in being’.
The other issue was the Italian Navy. We tend to remember the Italian Navy as a joke, but in 1941 it was a force to be reckoned with. Even post-Taranto, the Italians possessed three modern fast battleships, as well as a number of older units that had been effectively updated. The RN did not dominate the Med in 1941; if the German Navy hadn’t existed, the forces thus freed up would more likely have been used against the Italians than in deterrence of the Japanese. The continued presence of several powerful French units, and the possibility that Vichy might join the Axis, also limited the Royal Navy’s ability to deploy to the Pacific.
Thus, the idea that the German Navy represented a major drain on Allied resources isn’t quite wrong, but there’s a significant danger of overstating its impact. The Royal Navy seemed overstretched in 1941 because it was genuinely overstretched; it was utterly incapable of fighting the Germans, Italians, and Japanese all on its own. This matters, because the Tirpitz example leads URR to ask:
Could a burgeoning Chinese Navy become a “fleet in being”? What implications does that hold for the United States? In each historical example, a “fleet in being” that threatened vital interests was countered by one of two approaches. The first was the dedication of naval combat power in excess of that which such a “fleet in being” could bring to bear, ensuring a reasonable chance of victory. The second was an attack (pre-emptive in some notable cases) on that fleet from the air while the critical elements of that fleet were in harbor.
For this parallel to make sense, we would have to posit additional naval powers that would stretch the USN beyond its breaking point. The German Navy was ineffective in the face of British superiority in the absence of the Japanese and Italian navies; the ’stretching’ of British forces was strategically useful only in that it left the Royal Navy unable to fight effectively in other theaters. The Royal Navy was also demonstrably inferior in naval capabilities to the coalition of Japan, Italy, and Germany. There is no comparable modern counter-coalition to the USN, unless you imagine simultaneous hot wars against China, Russia, Japan, and the EU. Thus, until the United States faces the potential of such a coalition, I doubt that it’s helpful to think in terms of pre-emption; overwhelming superiority will do.
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Tags: class battleship, denmark strait, german navy, prince of wales, wwii battleships
Saturday, November 14th 2009 at 1:54 am |
Well, let’s see..
“First a technical quibble; the idea that Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat can’t be allowed to sit uncontested. ”
When Tirpitz was commissioned in February 1941, neither of the North Carolinas had been completed. Only KGV and Prince of Wales in the RN had been commissioned. Even so, the German vessel was comparable in size to both warship classes, had very comparable armor, and held a 4 knot speed advantage over the North Carolinas, and 3 knots over the KGVs. With the British shortage of modern aircraft carriers, surface vessels (especially under the protection of coastal-based aircraft) still represented a serious threat. Those warships, along with modernized Japanese and Italian units, represented the post-London Treaty generation of battleship clearly superior to predecessors, and were among the most powerful units afloat.
Some other points/counter points:
The French Navy after capitulation was also a “fleet in being” to the British, and led to the very painful and controversial decision to destroy it at Mers-el-Kebir, in July of 1940. Certainly the British attack on Taranto was aimed at reducing Italian surface power in the Med.
While it can be debated that the German presence in northern waters drew ten times its power in RN units to keep it contained, that case could be made, that nearly the entire Home Fleet, plus a great deal of what was initially dedicated to early convoy duty, was to counter a possible foray by individual or groups of German warships into the shipping lanes of the Atlantic.
An important point to remember is that the concept of the “fleet in being” is as much in the mind of the beholder as it is the owner of such a fleet. Precisely a point a commentor made on the USNI site for this post. Was the German surface fleet ever that dangerous to the RN and later the combined force of the RN/USN? Likely not. But in the early stages of a war Britain was clearly losing on land, such a risk on the seas was considered unacceptable, and the response to the threat of Tirpitz and her companion vessels reflect that.
Also, I was not advocating any preemptive strike against the PLAN. But merely pointing out that such actions have been taken in response to such a real or perceived “fleet in being”. I draw what I believe is a very valid parallel, and ask the open question as to what the US response will and should be considering our world-wide commitments AND the value of our presence and influence on the Pacific Rim.
chinasecurityblog Reply:
November 14th, 2009 at 4:20 am
Thank you for the very detailed comment.
[WORDPRESS HASHCASH] The poster sent us ‘0 which is not a hashcash value.